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The rapid growth of AI systems has implications on a wide variety of fields. It can 
prove to be a boon to disparate fields such as healthcare, education, global logistics 
and transportation, to name a few. However, these systems will also bring forth far-
reaching changes in employment, economy and security. As AI systems gain 
acceptance and become more commonplace, certain critical questions arise: What 
are the legal and security ramifications of the use of these new technologies? Who 
can use them, and under what circumstances? What is the safety of these systems? 
Should their commercialization be regulated? What are the privacy issues 
associated with the use of these technologies? What are the ethical considerations? 
Who has responsibility for the large amounts of data that is collected and 
manipulated by these systems? Could these systems fail? What is the recourse if 
there is a system failure? These questions are but a small subset of possible 
questions in this key emerging field. In this paper, we focus primarily on the legal 
questions that relate to the security, privacy, ethical, and policy considerations that 
emerge from one of these types of technologies, namely social robots. We begin 
with a history of the field, then go deeper into legal issues, the associated issues of 
security, privacy and ethics, and consider some solutions to these issues.  Finally, 
we conclude with a look at the future as well as a modest proposal for future 
research addressing some of the challenges listed. 
 






The rapid growth of AI systems has implications on a wide variety of fields. It can 
prove to be a boon to disparate fields such as healthcare, education, global logistics 
and transportation, to name a few. However, these systems will also bring forth far-
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reaching changes in employment, economy and security. The US government has 
started to take notice of these developments. On May 3, 2016, the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a series of four public 




Indeed, as AI systems gain acceptance and become more commonplace, certain 
critical questions arise: What are the security and legal ramifications of the use of 
these new technologies? Who can use them, and under what circumstances? What 
is the safety of these systems? Should their commercialization be regulated? What 
are the privacy issues associated with the use of these technologies? What are the 
ethical considerations? Who has responsibility for the large amounts of data that is 
collected and manipulated by these systems? Could these systems fail? What is the 
recourse if there is a system failure? 
 
These questions are but a small subset of possible questions in this key emerging 
field. It would be impossible to address all of these questions in a single project or 
paper. Therefore, in this paper, we focus our attention primarily on the legal 
questions that relate to the security, privacy, ethical, and policy considerations of 
one of these types of technologies, namely social robots. 
 
To set the context we first provide a brief introduction to history and developments 
in AI that have led to the current interest in social robots. The history and origins 
of AI, its emergence as a ‘field,’ early successes and failures, and the more recent 
resurgence provide a useful background. We then focus on the history of social 
robots, a technology that is increasingly becoming prevalent in quotidian society. 
Following that we discuss issues and challenges connected with social robots, 
focusing mainly on legal issues with respect to the security, privacy, ethical and 
policy aspects of this technology. Finally, we conclude with a look at the future as 
well as a modest proposal for addressing some of the challenges listed. 
 
The methodology used is a combination of historical and qualitative research. The 
qualitative research focuses primarily on analyses and opinions by non-academic 
and academic researchers, philosophers, as well as sociologists and technology 
entrepreneurs. Policy statements made by analysts, lawyers as well as government 
officials in the US are also considered where warranted. The primary methods for 
acquiring the above “data” are library research and public policy statements that 
have appeared in white papers, media statements and research reports. 
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BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AI AND SOCIAL 
ROBOTS 
 
The notion of building and endowing objects with intelligence has fascinated 
humans for a very long time. Some famous examples are: The Roman poet Ovid, 
who narrated the story of Pygmalion, the sculptor in Metamorphoses (8AD). 
Pygmalion created a statue of a woman so beautiful that he fell in love with it. He 
prayed to Aphrodite, who granted him his secret wish, which brought his statue life 
- enabling Pygmalion to marry his now-alive statute; and the Golem, a living 
creature created from dust and clay by a rabbi in Prague, who was then deployed 
against Roman soldiers who were attacking the city. More modern stories such as 
Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein (1818) and Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio (1883) narrate 
human attempts to fashion living beings out of inanimate objects. 
 
Moving forward to the mid-twentieth century, a few scientists working in disparate 
fields such as mathematics, psychology, engineering and economics began 
discussing the possibility of creating machines that could “think.” In 1950, Alan 
Turing published his seminal paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” in 
the journal Mind (Turing, 1950), in which he described the famous Turing Test1 for 
the first time. In 1951, Marvin Minsky, a graduate student at Princeton, teamed up 
with a physics student, Dean Edmonds, to design a neurocomputer code-named 
SNARC (Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Computer) that could simulate 
a rat finding its way through a maze. This was the first computer built on the 
principles of neural networks (Bernstein, 1981).   
 
The contemporary field of AI was born sixty years ago in August, 1956 at the 
Dartmouth Artificial Intelligence Conference. The conference was organized by 
John McCarthy, a professor at Dartmouth University. He coined the term “artificial 
intelligence” while writing his proposal for the AI conference. In 1958 McCarthy 
and Minsky started the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab (Chiou, Music, Sprague, & 
Wahba, 2001). The years following were heady times for AI. A lot was promised, 
and there was a good flow of government funding for AI research. However, even 
though several chess-playing computers were created during the next decade, there 
was not much by way of real progress. In 1963, Project MAC was set up at MIT 
under the direction of Robert Fano. There are conflicting theories about what the 
                                                      
1 In his 1950 paper, Alan Turing described ‘the Imitation Game,’ which eventually came to be 
referred to as the ‘Turing Test.’ In the Imitation Game, a computer and a human would be 
interrogated (using text messages) under conditions where the interrogator would not know which 
was, and which was not, a computer. Turing wrote that if the interrogator could not differentiate 
the computer from the human, then it would not be unreasonable to call the computer intelligent.    
Emergent AI, Social Robots and the Law: Security, Privacy and Policy Issues                            Ramesh Subramanian 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017  84 ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
acronym “MAC” stood for. Some believe that it stood for “Machine-Aided 
Cognition” whereas others believe it stood for “Multiple-Access Computer,” 
signifying the work at MIT pertaining to time-sharing and multiple access of servers 
(Chiou et al., 2001). In 1962, some MIT students created a chess program that could 
beat amateur human chess players. In 1967, another MIT programmer Richard 
Greenblatt added several heuristics to an existing chess program that enabled the 
program it to score a very high 1400 score at a chess competition (Larson, 2016). 
However, beyond these examples of chess playing programs, and several research 
projects, useful AI was still not achievable. This led to a gradual reduction of 
funding for AI research. Interest in the field dropped from 1974 to 1980, and again 
from 1987 to 1993 (Lewis, 2014). However, during the 1980s, there was quite a lot 
of research in AI. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI)’s Fifth Generation Project sought to develop AI computers using massive 
parallelism. The first Lisp machines were developed and marketed. These allowed 
the development of expert system shells, which could be used to develop custom 
expert systems. In 1981, Daniel Hillis developed the Connection Machine at MIT. 
This was based on massive parallel processing. By the mid-1980s, systems that used 
neural networks began to be used widely. But despite these pockets of development 
in the field, the development of a cognitive machine remained elusive. 
 
The big break for AI came in 1997, when IBM developed the Deep Blue 
supercomputer. Deep Blue had enormous processing capacity and beat expert chess 
players such as Gary Kasparov, the Russian Grandmaster. This was followed in 
2011 by the Watson supercomputer, which won the “Jeopardy” TV quiz show 
(Markoff, 2011). In 2014, the “chatterbot” Eugene Goostman, developed by 
Vladimir Vasilov, Eugene Demchenko and Sergey Ulasen, is claimed to have 
passed the Turing Test, even though there is disagreement in the literature about the 
extent of its success (Schofield, 2014).  
 
 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF AI 
 
Today, the Turing Test is no longer considered to be the absolute arbiter of a 
computer’s capabilities in behaving like a human. Freed of that requirement, the 
last decade has seen tremendous renewed interest in Artificial Intelligence. This 
stems from developments in four areas: Exponentially increased computer 
processor capabilities; emergence of global digital networks; advances in 
distributed computing (hardware and software); and the emergence of Big Data. 
The confluence of these developments in information technology, plus 
developments in psychology and sociology has brought about a new impetus to AI 
research. New intelligent, self-organizing and self-governing systems are becoming 
Journal of International Technology and Information Management  Volume 26, Number 3 2017 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017 85 ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
 
prevalent in today’s business and society. Examples are social robots, driverless 
automobiles, autonomous flight systems (drones), and software “agents.”  
 
 
SOCIAL ROBOTS: DEFINITION 
The American-born British neurophysiologist and robotician William Grey Walter 
is recognized as the father of the Social Robots field. He published his seminal 
papers An Imitation of Life in 1950 and A Machine That Learns in 1951 (Walter, 
1950, 1951), in which he described analog versions of an autonomous, self-learning 
machines nick-named Tortoises, due to their shape and slow movement. They were 
able to navigate through light signals. Robots have undergone phenomenal changes 
since then. Present-day Social Robots are digital, autonomous robots that are 
designed to independently interact and communicate with humans. They are 
generally built with features that resemble a humanoid form to some extent. They 
are capable of reasoning and independent actions, but within certain set constraints 
(which include safety mechanisms). In early 2015, Google was granted a patent for 
a robot with different personalities (Kharpal, 2015). 
There are currently several definitions available for Social Robots. Some 
researchers even differentiate between Social Robots and Societal Robots. The 
former refers to those that can interact autonomously with other robots. The latter 
refers to those that are primary built to interact with humans (Duffy, Rooney, 
O’Hare, & O’Donoghue, 1999). We use the term social robots to refer to both types. 
Goran Bubaš and Alen Lovrenčić formalize six dimensions of interpersonal 
communications between artificial systems and humans, which they call 
“interpersonal communication competence” (ICC). They suggest that ICC should 
be applied in designing artificial systems that can communicate and interact with 
humans. The 6 dimensions of ICC are: (i) encoding and decoding, (ii) intentionality, 
(iii) communication effectiveness, (iv) other-orientedness, (v) expressiveness, and 
(vi) social relaxation (Bubaš & Lovrenčić, 2002). 
Frank Hegel et al suggest that a while the social robot is perceived as a social entity, 
doing so would just be an anthropomorphic reaction. Instead, they suggest that a 
social robot should be studied with reference to form, function and context. Hegel 
et al define a social robot thus: “A social robot combines technical aspects as well 
as social aspects – but the social aspects are the core purpose of social robots.” 
Kate Darling, a researcher at the MIT Media Lab, provides this general definition 
of social robots:  
“A social robot is a physically embodied, autonomous agent that 
communicates and interacts with humans on an emotional level… it is 
important to distinguish social robots from inanimate computers, as well as 
from industrial or service robots that are not designed to elicit human 
feelings and mimic social cues. Social robots also follow social behavior 
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patterns, have various “states of mind,” and adapt to what they learn through 
their interactions (Darling, 2012).” 
Darling notes that social robots also mimic emotional states, exhibit adaptive 
behavior, and react to social cues. A good example is the Jibo, a “family robot” 
developed by social robotics pioneer Cynthia Breazeal, which is capable of 
assisting in a variety of household chores, as well as be a companion to household 
members (Martin, 2017).  
Social robots do not necessarily have humanoid forms. They increasingly take on 
animaloid forms. Examples are Sony’s AIBO dog; Innovo Labs’ dinosaur Pleo; 
robot companions such as Aldebaran’s NAO and Pepper robots; medical and health 
monitoring devices like the therapeutic Paro baby seal and Intuitive Automata’s 
weight loss coach Autom; and household robots like Jibo (Darling, 2012). Various 
aspects of these robots are being studied in academic and government labs around 
the world. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is studying the uses of animaloid 
companion robots for older people in various stages of dementia and Alzheimer’s 
disease (Odetti et al., 2007). The Riken-SRK Collaboration Center for Human-
Interactive Robot Research (Japan) is testing the ‘RoBear’ to assist the elderly in 
everyday tasks (Byford, 2015). The weight-loss coach robot Autom was first 
developed at the MIT Media Lab in 2007 (Ackerman, 2012). At present, the MIT 
Personal Robots Group is one among several labs and companies that are testing 
robots to be personal assistants, story-telling companions, and language learning 
companions, etc. 
 
SOCIAL ROBOTS AND AUTONOMY 
 
At present there is debate on whether a social robot should be fully autonomous or 
semi-autonomous. Our view is that a remote controlled robot or a drone cannot be 
considered a social robot, as they are not fully autonomous. In a similar vein, a 
robotic soldier, which is really a programmed weapon of war, also cannot be 
considered to be a social robot.  As noted by Donald Norman (Norman, 2002): 
“The question is, how do you make a home robot that is autonomous, that lives by 
itself, that won't get stuck in corners, and doesn't have to be reminded so that it 
doesn't run out of power? It had to get frustrated. Being frustrated gets it out of 
deadlocks. If it's stuck somewhere trapped in a corner, it has intelligent algorithms 
trying to get it out. But if they fail, it says, "the hell with it," and goes off and does 
something else. It should be afraid of heights so that it doesn't fall down the stairs. 
It should get fatigued so that it won't wear out the battery. As its battery level gets 
lower, it should travel more slowly and not do some tasks. It should always make 
sure it’s close enough to the recharging station so that it can get back.” 
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ISSUES IN SOCIAL ROBOTS 
 
To recap, social robots are capable of being fully autonomous, exhibiting affective 
behavior, and learning adaptively. They learn and incorporate cooperation and 
competition, trust and distrust, social and cultural norms. They can perform as 
human surrogates. The increasing prevalence of social robots in everyday society 
raises many questions, issues and concerns. There are numerous legal, security, and 
ethical implications. Since the focus of this paper is to broadly examine legal 
implications, focusing on security, ethical and policy implications, we look at some 
of the important legal cases and judgements pertaining to robots in the past, as well 
as important writings on the subject by legal scholars. We highlight the 
shortcomings of these laws and judgements and discuss the need for new legal 
considerations in the context of social robots.  
 
To look at cases and judgements, we start by reviewing Ryan Calo’s examination 
of robots and American law (Calo, 2016).  
 
 
ROBOT APPROPRIATION & IMPERSONATION 
 
Robot appropriation cases refer to situations where a plaintiff brought a petition 
against a robot appropriating a human, or even another robot, thereby causing loss 
to the human arising from unauthorized publicity. Examples are the White v. 
Samsung, Wendt v. Host International, Inc., and Elnicky Enterprises v. Spotlight, 
Inc. 
 
White v. Samsung: In the 1990s, Samsung Electronics ran an advertisement that 
depicted a robot which appeared to have some physical features of Vanna White, 
host of the TV show Wheel of Fortune, and which appeared to be hosting the show. 
White sued Samsung for violating her right of publicity. The 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with Vanna White. The court declared that Samsung was liable, 
and that any other decision would go against the common law right of publicity 
(Calo, 2016; Casebriefs LLC., 1993). 
 
Wendt v. Host International, Inc.: In 1995, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
again on a similar case. In that case, the defendant Host International was sued by 
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, who accused the company of using two 
robots in their airport bars named Cheers that appropriated the looks of Norm and 
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Cliff (played by Wendt and Ratzenberger), who were bar-buddies in the TV show 
Cheers. The plaintiffs accused Host International of violating their right of 
publicity. The court again ruled in favor of Wendt and Ratzenberger (Calo, 2016; 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1995).  
 
Elnicky Enterprises v. Spotlight, Inc.: This 1981 case precedes the previous two. 
Here, Elnicky Enterprises, which had developed a robot nick-named Rodney, sued 
Spotlight Presents, Inc., for developing an exact replica named Walter Ego. Judge 
Charles Brieant of the US District Court of Manhattan agreed with Elnicky’s claims 
and ruled in its favor.   
 
These three cases deal with the question of robot impersonation of humans and 
other robots. Even though the robots in question were prior to the development of 
social robots, this could well happen with social robots, too. So the question is 
whether a social robot, which can be imbued with personality, be allowed to 
impersonate other robots or other humans.  
 
Criminal impersonation, under the US legal system, is illegal, but governed by state 
laws, and thus may vary slightly from state to state. For example, the Connecticut 
Senate Bill No. 98 states criminal impersonation happens when the person 
impersonating (Senate-State of Connecticut, 2011) :  
1. Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent 
to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another 
2. Pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an 
act in such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or 
defraud another  
3. Pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized 
local police department or the Division of State Police within the 
Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any 
uniform, badge or shield by which such public servant is lawfully 
distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended 
official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense 
4. With intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, uses an electronic device 
to impersonate another and such act results in personal injury or financial 
loss to another or the initiation of judicial proceedings against another 
Social robots are unique in that they have both a digital and analog (physical) 
manifestation. From the earlier discussion, we see that the judges have not made 
any distinction between humans and robots when it comes to impersonation, even 
in the special case when a robot impersonated another robot. Therefore, we can 
conclude in this case that social robots will come under the purview of existing 
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impersonation statutes without any complication, as well as the common law 
governing right of publicity. 
 
 
ROBOT CREATIVITY & PERFORMANCE 
 
An illustrative case pertaining to robotic performance discussed by Calo (2016) is 
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Family Entertainment Centers (Leagle, 1986). In 
this case, the state of Maryland’s Comptroller of Treasury decided to levy 
assessments on Chuck E Cheese franchises belonging to Family Entertainment. The 
reason was a law that all restaurants in the state of Maryland were required to charge 
a sales tax on food, if there were a performance on the premises. Chuck E Cheese 
used some robotic puppets to provide a “performance” by singing and dancing. 
Chuck E Cheese filed lawsuit against the levy, arguing that the puppets were robots 
and hence did not qualify as performers, as they could not do anything spontaneous. 
The court agreed, and ruled that the robotic performance fell outside the scope of 
the statute. As noted by Calo, the court observed: 
 
“A] pre-programmed robot can perform a menial task but, because a pre-
programmed robot has no ‘skill’ and therefore leaves no room for 
spontaneous human flaw in an exhibition, it cannot ‘perform’ a piece of 
music … Just as a wind-up toy does not perform for purposes of [the 
statute,] neither does a pre-programmed mechanical robot.” 
 
However, robotic technology has reached an inflection point. Today researchers are 
developing social robots that can respond to human expressions, and can undertake 
creative endeavors such as acting, creating, music, and poetry writing (David, 2015; 
Wright, 2005). The author and literary critic Erica Wagner recounts how, when 
presented with two examples of poetry written by humans and computers, she was 
able to correctly guess one, but could not guess the other. Researchers at the 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in Spain are currently working on a project named 
“Robot Imagination System” which teaches robots to develop mental models of 
objects(Leber & Leber, 2013; Robotics Lab, n.d.). There are other impressive 
examples and demonstrations of creativity by robots, as reported by Martin Gayford 
(Gayford, 2016). Gayford describes intelligent systems such as AARON and The 
Painting Fool. The creator of the latter, Prof. Simon Colton of Goldsmits College, 
London, suggests that in order for a machine or robot to be considered creative, it 
should be skillful, appreciative and imaginative. Gayford notes that The Painting 
Fool has made progress in all these areas. 
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Given these developments, it is no longer possible to state unequivocally that a 
robot does not have or will never have imagination or creativity. This would be 
even more the case when applied to social robots. Companion robots like EmoSpark 
(from EmoShape), Jibo and Pepper robots can detect human companions’ emotions 
and act accordingly (Adee, 2015).  Thus, if a social robot was performing at Chuck 
E Cheese, the notion that it is devoid of creativity would likely become dependent 
on technological developments in the field. To the extent that one cannot 
completely argue that a social robot cannot act independently and exhibit any 
creativity, the judgement could well go against Family Entertainment Centers were 
it to come up now or in the future.   
 
One way the courts could sort out this ambivalence is to focus on the level of 
autonomy that a robot is imbued with in a specific area e.g. as music composition, 
drawing, or similar endeavor. If a robot has reached a critical level of autonomy, 






An important question is whether a social robot could function as a surrogate for a 
human. There are numerous instances where a robot has been deployed to work in 
environments that are not particularly safe for humans to work in. Examples include 
locating shipwrecks, undersea monitoring, bomb disposal, volcano, and space 
exploration. But there have also been some legal challenges to the validity of robots 
as human surrogates. An interesting case law is COLUMBUS-AMERICA 
DISCOVERY GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. The UNIDENTIFIED, WRECKED AND 
ABANDONED SAILING VESSEL (Justia Law, 1990), as noted by Calo (Calo, 
2016). 
 
In this case, The Columbia-America Discovery Group used robots to locate and 
gain access to the sunken wreck of S. S. Central America, a steamship carrying gold 
that sank on the Atlantic Ocean in 1857. Then the Discovery Group asked the US 
District Court of Eastern Virginia for complete salvage rights, and to restrict other 
similar salvage operations from access to the shipwreck. The court agreed, 
reasoning that since the robots were under full control of human operators, the 
Discovery Group was entitled to the request based on the “first salver rights” in 
maritime law (Justia Law, 1990). 
 
However, developments in technology have enabled fully autonomous robots to 
search for and map the geography of the ocean floor, locate shipwrecks, and once 
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located, autonomously inspect and report the findings. These are akin to giving a 
robot an idea of its mission, and then allowing the robot to autonomously search, 
locate, access and inspect the wrecks. These robots are not completely under the 
control of human “handlers.” They may react to unforeseen circumstances using 
their own prior knowledge rather than depending upon human intervention. The 
question that arises then is whether these robots are the surrogates of the human 
“owners”, under complete human control (which they are not) and whether the 
owners can claim that the robots are their surrogates employed for a specific 
purpose. Another question arises when an autonomous robot sent out to map ocean 
floor geography decides to investigate certain phenomenon and discovers a sunken 
treasure ship. In this case, can the human owners claim the shipwreck based on the 
“first salver” principle? 
 
Another interesting possibility is space exploration. If a fully autonomous robot is 
sent to a celestial object (planet, satellite, meteor, etc.) inside or outside our solar 
system, can the sender of that robot claim ownership if the robot lands in a particular 
object? At present, there is no answer to this, as there are no laws that addresses 
this situation. The United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs has adopted several 
resolutions focused towards international cooperation and peaceful uses of outer 
space (UN Office of Outer Space, n.d.). But none of them address the issue of 
ownership claims through robotic surrogacy as of now. However, considering plans 
by certain space entrepreneurs to colonize other planets in the solar system, it would 
be appropriate to consider the laws of ownership, especially through surrogates 
such as autonomous robots.  
 
 
ROBOTS AND PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
 
The above section naturally leads to the issue of whether robots can have rights to 
property ownership. In this, we look at a recent US Supreme Court Decision on 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. In that case, the plaintiffs (Hobby Lobby and two other 
private corporations sued the US Department of Health and Human Services, 
claiming that the department’s mandate to provide coverage for contraception 
violated their freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 
1993. The US Supreme Court agreed, recognizing that corporations are entitled to 
religious freedom under the First Amendment, just like actual people. Thus, 
corporations have the right to own property, enter into contracts, enforce contracts, 
and make political contributions (US Supreme Court, 2014). They can also be sued 
and held liable under civil and criminal law. US attorney John Frank Weaver argues 
that based on this reasoning, robots should have many of the rights that corporations 
have, such as owning property (Weaver & Henrickson, 2014), though there would 
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be some restrictions. Recently, the European parliament urged the drafting of rules 
that would govern the use and creation of robots a form of “electronic personhood,” 
which would also include rights to property ownership (Hern, 2017). Now if we 
consider social robots, which can actually be considered as human companions, we 
could use and even extend the reasoning whereby social robots may eventually be 
allowed to own property and even be considered a beneficiary in a person’s will. 
 
 
ROBOT OBJECT AND MEMORY PERMANENCE 
 
A critical issue pertaining to property ownership, acquisitions and retention is the 
notion of object permanence. While companies are generally accepted as fairly 
permanent entities, we do not think the same of robots. However, there is currently 
research underway on creating social robots that can acquire and retain memory 
and consciousness. A prime example is Bina 48, which is a representation of the 
wife of Martine Rosenblatt, CEO of Flolan Pharmaceuticals, and founder of Sirius 
Satellite Radio (Gary, 2015). Bina 48 has the consciousness and memory of Bina 
Rosenblatt, and can be a precursor of robots with memory and permanence. This 
also raises the issue of uploading memory and consciousness into the cloud, to be 





How do current laws apply to robots used in burglary? We see two possibilities that 
could occur with today’s robots in the context of burglary. The first is when the 
owner of a robot uses the robot to burgle. The second is when a robot belonging to 
an individual is co-opted by another and then used to commit burglary. We address 
these two scenarios, again using case laws.     
 
The question of robotic burglary has been partly addressed by the US courts for 
many years, though most of them have been before the advent of the newer robots. 
Thus the past cases do not explicitly involve robots. For example, one case involved 
the use of stolen credit cards in an ATM (the stolen card being the artificial object 
that is used in the burglary) (People v. Ravenscroft (Justia Law, 1988)). In that case, 
the question was whether the defendant was breaking and entering to burgle the 
bank, even though he was just using the ATM belonging to the bank. The court 
decided that he was indeed breaking and entering the bank with intent to burgle. A 
second case (People v. David, 1998) involved David, the defendant, presenting a 
forged check to a teller of a check cashing business by placing the check in a deposit 
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chute. The defendant maintained that his burglary conviction should be reversed 
because he did not actually enter the facility (California Supreme Court, 1998). In 
that case also, the court ruled that David did indeed burgle the business in question, 
even though he did not personally enter the business. 
 
In both of these past cases, the key point that the courts ruled on was that it was not 
really necessary for a person to enter a facility in order to burgle it. He/she could 
use a surrogate or a technology. Thus, if we consider robots as the new technology, 
by using this consideration, the person who uses a robot to burgle could still be 
convicted of burglary even if he did not enter a particular facility. This reasoning 
would also logically apply to telepresence robots, since they are typically used to 
virtually extend the presence of an individual.  
 
The second scenario is when a compromised robot belonging to another is used to 
commit burglary. Here the robot can be inside an organization or facility, but could 
have been compromised and made to undertake actions that either directly or 
indirectly helps or participates in the burglary. This scenario gets complicated 
because the perpetrator, if caught, could plead that while he/she hacked into and 
gained control of an ‘internal robot,’ he/she did not actually command the robot to 
burgle. (Basically, the perpetrator can command the robot to undertake certain 
actions that could indirectly facilitate his/her criminal action). At present, we are 
unaware of any law that addresses this situation.  
 
Moving to the present and near future, if we consider a social robot, the situation 
becomes even more murky. For instance, can a social robot, aiming to please its 
human companion, undertake certain actions, including burglary, if it considered it 
necessary? What are the rules governing such situations? Would this be a design 
issue? In addressing the law concerning these issue, it would be appropriate to 
consider surrogate liability laws, parental liability laws and accomplice liability 





An interesting perspective is available from military law. The US military has 
maintained the practice of using surrogate forces in conflicts for a long time. In this 
scenario, it is possible that these surrogate forces commit some crimes. If that 
should happen, one question would focus on what legal liability does the US or its 
military forces face for the crimes of the surrogate forces. Captain Gregory R. Bart 
of the US Navy has argued that the US military forces have no legal duty to 
investigate or intervene against war crimes committed by surrogate forces as long 
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as the US forces do not directly participate in those crimes (Bart, 2014). Bart’s 
arguments are confirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), thus setting an international precedent. The ICTY ruled in 
2011 that individuals who provide material support (and arms) to surrogate forces 
are not liable for the crimes committed by those surrogates if a direct order has not 
been issued (ICTY, 2011). 
 
These cases and postings from the US military seem to imply that where a surrogate 
commits a crime, the “owner” or employer cannot be held liable. If we assume that 
(social) robots are surrogate technology, and apply the military laws as precedent, 
then in cases where a crime such as burglary is committed by a robot, the robot’s 
owner is not liable for those actions, according to the precedent.  
 
This thought is echoed in the civilian realm by legal scholar Garbiel Hallevy, who 
states that if the artificial entity is capable of reasoning and acting independently, 
and commits a crime that neither the programmer of the robot nor the user intended 
to happen, nor could be considered a natural probable consequence of the 
programmer’s coding or the user’s actual use of the robot, then the robot (or 
artificial entity alone is liable, not the programmer of the AI or the user/owner 
(Hallevy, 2010b). However, Hallevy also states that if the programmer coded the 
robot in a manner that allowed it to commit a crime, and the robot committed a 
crime that was beyond and more serious than what the programmer intended, then 






Another perspective comes from the realm of Family Law pertaining to Parental 
Responsibilities. If we can assume that a social robot is akin to a child of the owner, 
then these laws can be considered for addressing situations where a robot, under or 
outside the control of the human owner, causes damage or participates in criminal 
acts. There exist parental responsibility laws in every state in the US. In the state of 
Connecticut, the 2005 Connecticut Code – Sec 52-572, Parental liability for torts 
of minors states that parents and guardians of minors will be held responsible if 
those minors “maliciously cause damage to any property or injury to any person 
(Justia Law, 2005).”  
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An accomplice is a person who encourages and aids a perpetrator in a criminal 
scheme. Over the years, courts have extended the liability stemming from the 
criminal acts of the perpetrator to the accomplice also (Hallevy, 2010a). In the case 
of an autonomously functioning social robot, if the robot willfully aids in a criminal 
act of the user or owner, while knowing that it is indeed a criminal act, then the 
robot becomes an accomplice to the crime and is thus as liable as the perpetrator 
himself. Here there could be an extended scenario, wherein one robot commits the 
criminal act, but gets another robot to aid the act by gaining control of the second 
robot. Even in this case, if we assume that the second robot has the capability for 
autonomous reasoning, then the second robot is indeed criminally liable.        
 
 
WHAT DOES ROBOTIC LIABILITY REALLY MEAN? 
 
Many past writings on robots, even fully autonomous robots take the view that the 
notion of liability does not make any sense as far as robots are concerned. In that 
case, what would be the appropriate consequence of a robot indulging in crime, or 
destroying property, indulging in vandalism, or other aggressive, unwanted and 
unlawful behavior? One view is to treat a robot as an assistant. In that case, if the 
robot software is bad or damaged, then it is likely that the robot may undertake 
certain actions that is unlawful. In other cases, a robot may hurt people or damage 
property accidentally, during its learning stages. In some cases a robot may decide 
to commit a crime in order to help its user/owner. Or a robot may hurt people or 
damage property purely as self-defense.  
 
In all of these cases, the closest that robots come to are companies and corporations. 
Punishment is often meted out to corporations for wrong-doing. There are a variety 
of punishments to such corporations, such as fines, prohibition to operate, 
reparations, etc. These sorts of punishments are effective because in the end, there 
are people behind the corporations, who do not want to be completely incapacitated 
from the corporation’s actions and the resulting punishments. We could consider 
treating robots as companies, in which case the robot may be fines, forced to pay 
reparations, or forced to cease operating. For robots to be able to pay the fines, they 
must have some form of liability insurance that should be set up by the robot 
manufacturers (for damages and unlawful acts resulting from software 
malfunctions) and users who acquire robots as assistants (for communicating with 
the robots in such a manner as to encourage the robot to undertake autonomous 
action with a view to protecting its user/owner).  
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Given the above reasoning, we believe that it would be more appropriate to consider 
the social robot as a servant – a mostly autonomous person who nevertheless 
performs duties for others. If we use this reasoning, the issue of liability become a 
lot clearer. There are numerous case-laws and writings that focus on this issue. 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is held vicariously liable for 
the tortious conduct of his servant committed within the scope of the servant's 
employment (Brill, 1968). However, the phrase “within the scope of the servant’s 
employment” causes more confusion, since there is no clear sense of how far the 
scope could extend. Brill (1968) points to a lot of issues with the application of this 
phrase, but concludes with a support of respondeat superior, stating that “the 
employer is the one best able to absorb the injured person's losses as a risk of doing 
business and to pass them on to society as a whole.” The whole notion of respondeat 
superior will no doubt be challenged and re-examined in the future, in the context 
of social robots. However, we believe that this doctrine provides one of the best 
approaches to sort out the issue of the liability of social robots. 
 
The above discussion primarily focused on certain important legal issues pertaining 
to social robots, which is the main objective and focus on this paper. In the next 
few sections we briefly address some of the security, privacy and ethical issues that 
present themselves in any consideration of social robots.  
 
 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SOCIAL ROBOTS 
 
The practical issues with respect to privacy involve data protection and data 
transfer. These issues however do not differ too much from the security involving 
current networked systems. Robots constantly interact with the environments in 
which they operate. This involves continuous transfer of large amounts of data in 
and out of the system. With respect to social robots, the data is not just 
environmental and contextual data, but also those that pertain to the specific 
humans that these robots are attached to. This could include sensitive health and 
financial information. Thus it goes without saying that security and discreetness of 
social robots is obviously a very critical design imperative. It affects the safety and 
security of the robot as well as the individual that it is associated with, including 
the individual’s properties. In this context, it would probably be useful to develop 
security standards for social robots, which could involve biometric methods to 
identify “safe” humans and their commands. These are primarily what we consider 
to be “design issues.” In this regard, a group of robotics researchers at the 
University of Washington experimented with some household robots in 2009. They 
found that they could easily hack into the robots and control their actions (Denning, 
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Matuszek, Koscher, Smith, & Kohno, 2009). Based on their study, they then 
published a set of design questions that could be used as a template when designing 
social robots. The designs basically start with the purpose of the robot, and then 
develop a set of questions that will enable their safe development and deployment.  
Legal scholar Jack Balkin has proposed three “laws of robotics for the Algorithmic 
Society (Balkin, 2016) to address some of these legal issues:” 
 
1. Algorithmic operators are information fiduciaries with respect to their 
clients and end-users 
2. Algorithmic operators have public duties toward the general public 
3. The central public duty of algorithmic operators is not to be algorithmic 
nuisances. They may not externalize the social costs of their use of 
algorithms onto the general public 
However, Balkin’s proposal might well be overshadowed by more recent advances 
in robotics and algorithmic reasoning processes that bring social robots closer and 
closer in their likeness, capability, and adaptability to humans. As AI advances, we 
have algorithmic operators that are capable of enhanced reasoning, and adding new 
knowledge to their algorithms that resembles human learning processes. 
In addition to maintaining the privacy of data, there is an additional, cultural notion 
of privacy. Privacy in the social robotic context also involves cultural notions of 
privacy. As social robots become highly attuned to a human’s emotive state, they 
need to identify the notion of “personal space” and be able to maintain a socially 
and culturally acceptable, appropriate “distance” without invading the privacy of 
the human. This would require further research on psycho-sociology of social 
robots. However, the template provided by Denning et al (above) does provide us 
with a starting point for these considerations. 
 
Additionally, on the issue of security, we also need to consider the risks and 
challenges that may emerge as we move towards “open-source” robotics. Such a 
development would certainly challenge ownership and responsibility concepts, and 
may pose additional security problems. A direct result of this development would 
be the co-opting of social robots by terrorists to suit their nefarious designs. This 
development may require global treaties and arrangements with member nations to 
address and curb such developments.  
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ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
There is growing literature on how humans get attached to inanimate objects, such 
as cars and stuffed toys. For instance, in the movie Cast Away, Tom Hanks develops 
an attachment to a volleyball, and is distressed when he lets the ball float away by 
accident. Kate Darling reports a military exercise where a six-legged robot was 
being used to spot land mines. Each time the robot stepped on a mine, one of its 
legs would get blown off, but the robot will continue with its remaining legs. This 
so distressed the commander in charge that he is supposed to have termed the 
exercise “inhumane” and canceled it (Darling, 2012)! There are several ethical 
issues that are being studied or discussed with respect to the use of these social 
robots. One is the “real versus fake” problem. Users of these robots could, over 
time, lose the ability to distinguish between what is real and what is fake, and by 
extension, what is authentic, and what is not. Another issue is the ethicality of 
replacing humans with machines in areas such as elder care, child care, etc. More 
studies are required in what are the long term emotional effects of these 
replacements on humans. Another issue is manipulation of people through these 
social robots. If users get attached to their social robots, it becomes eminently 
possible for companies and other nefarious organizations to use the robots as a 
means to control their human companions (e.g. through advertisements, 
exploitative maintenance costs, etc.). Another important and much discussed 
emerging issue pertains to social robots being used as objects of sex. There are 
obviously numerous implications that arise out of this, which include the legalities 
of social robots as sexual objects, gender issues, child pornography, gender issues 
and even sexual healing and therapy. Some of these issues are discussed in a recent 
report issued by the Foundation for Responsible Robotics (Sharkey, Wynsberghe, 
Robbins, & Hancock, 2017). While this is not the main focus of this paper, we 
believe that the issue of robots as sexual objects, and the implications that would 
arise from that, will be studied more seriously in the future. What is important is 
the all of the above issues raise the question of regulations and public policy 
formulations for social robots, which will be an important subject of study and 





In this working paper we have briefly traced the history of social robots, and raised 
many issues and questions that pertain to the presence and availability of social 
robots in society. We have looked at the ramifications of social robots from many 
angles: Design issues; security and privacy issues; ethical issues, and most 
importantly, legal issues. The list issues are not by any means complete or resolved. 
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At present several researchers from various disciplines are working on some of the 
above questions, in order to get some answers. These researchers have primarily 
come from the fields of computer hardware, algorithm design, human computer 
interaction or HCI, law, psychology, sociology and ethics. To this mix, we could 
add businesses. It is quite likely that in the future, business organizations would be 
the biggest beneficiaries of social robots – for advertising, data mining, automating 
and basic operational decision-making. We hope that this paper will help 
researchers interested in the emerging field of social robots to understand some of 
the issues, and formulate solutions to these issues. A US attorney John Weaver puts 
forth a case for giving robots the following rights and obligations (Weaver & 
Henrickson, 2014): 
 
1. The right to enter into and perform contracts 
2. The obligation to carry insurance 
3. The right to own intellectual property 
4. The obligation of liability 
5. The right to be a guardian of a minor  
To this list, we would also add the right of a social robot to be the guardian and 
companions of invalid persons and senior citizens, keeping in mind that many of 
the above “rights and obligations” are already accorded to corporations under US 
laws and court decisions.  
We also realize that this paper has shortcomings – most important of which is the 
focus on US laws and a general focus on US-related issues when discussing social 
robotics. We are aware that many countries in the EU are similarly studying the 
issues raised by the emergence of robots and social robots. The Policy Department 
of the European Parliament has recently published a report titled “European Civil 
Law Rules in Robotics,” with the aim of providing information on the legal and 
ethical issues raised by these new technologies (Directorate-General of Internal 
Policies, 2016). Other nations may soon add their own studies, reports and laws. 
We thus believe that the emerging field of robots, especially social robots, has the 
potential to change the world and the legal, social and ethical constructs that we 
currently know and adhere to. In the near future, we may have to share the world 
with the new entity that would possess superior knowledge management and 
processing power, reasoning capabilities, physical strength and adaptability. It is 
therefore important for researchers in disparate fields to focus more attention to the 
global rise of this new entity.  
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